veyepar: Security not by chance: the AltusMetrum hardware true random number generator

Author(s):	Tom Marble
Location	Room 329
Date	aug Tue 26	Days Raw Files
Start	14:30	First Raw Start	14:27
Duration	00:45:00	Offset	0:02:32
End	15:15	Last Raw End	15:31
Chapters	00:00 0:01:37 0:01:40
Total cuts_time	58 min.

https://summit.debconf.org/debconf14/meeting/20/security-not-by-chance-the-altusmetrum-hardware-true-random-number-generator/
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Many elements of security we rely on such as generating of encryption
keys and synthesizing one time session keys depend on random number
generation. Any predictability of these numbers introduces potential
weakness in secure systems.  We often use Pseudo-random number
generators (PRNGs) because they are quick and convenient, yet they are
deterministic algorithms for approximating a sequence of random numbers.

By contrast a true random number generator (TRNG) is implemented in
hardware based on a physical process that creates unpredictable noise.
Often entropy from TRNGs is used to seed PRNGs to provide a balance of
speed and unpredictability.

In this talk I will discuss the USB TRNG project of AltusMetrum to
create a fully open source hardware TRNG. Why make yet another TRNG
when several are commercially available? Because most existing TRNGs
are expensive, out-of-stock or based on closed designs. The USB TRNG
can be connected to the Entropy Key Daemon (ekeyd) which can provide
entropy directly to the kernel pool or serving via the EGD protocol.

How can we evaluate the quality of the USB TRNG? Results of statistical
analysis will provided along with detailed design documents in order
to encourage critical community review.

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