Author(s):	bunnie, Sean "xobs" Cross, Tom Marble
Location	Arena
Date	jan Fri 17	Days Raw Files
Start	13:30	First Raw Start	error-in-template
Duration	0:45:0	Offset	None
End	14:15	Last Raw End
Chapters
Total cuts_time	None min.

https://lca2020.linux.org.au/schedule/presentation/37/
raw-playlist raw-mp4-playlist encoded-files-playlist mp4 svg png

assets release.pdf Betrusted_Better_Security_Through_Physical_Partitioning.json
logs
Admin: episode episode list cut list raw files day marks day marks day image_files

State:	--------- borked edit encode push to queue post richard review 1 email review 2 make public tweet to-miror conf done
Locked:	clear this to unlock
Locked by:	user/process that locked.
Start:	initially scheduled time from master, adjusted to match reality
Duration:	length in hh:mm:ss
Name:	Video Title (shows in video search results)
Emails:	email(s) of the presenter(s)
Released:	Unknown Yes No has someone authorised pubication
Normalise:
Channelcopy:	m=mono, 01=copy left to right, 10=right to left, 00=ignore.
Thumbnail:	filename.png
Description:	The condensation of virtually everything into a single device -- the smartphone -- has normalized deviant behaviors that create security risks. For example, many smartphone users conduct secure transactions while juggling several other apps, thus creating opportunities for adversaries to exploit human error. Furthermore, running both secure and insecure code on a common CPU increases the risk of exposing user secrets thanks to microarchitectural side channels -- a large, complex, and opaque attack surface. System architects have introduced "secure enclaves" as a technique to minimize the attack surface between sensitive secrets and an untrusted CPU. In theory, secret key material never leaves the perimeter of the enclave – keys are generated and stored permanently within the enclave. Regardless of the implementation details, secure enclaves inevitably rely on an untrusted CPU to relay messages to the user. This is because there is typically just one screen and keyboard presented to the user, and these elements are directly connected to the untrusted CPU. Thus, secure enclaves can only protect keys from being compromised; they cannot protect the data itself from compromise. This talk introduces Betrusted, a device designed to partition a set of secure applications into a physically separate device that is designed using security-first principles: the hardware is simple, open source, and is user-verifiable from the keyboard to the LCD. Putting secure apps on a separate screen also helps users focus on their secure transactions, while minimizing attack surfaces and eliminating microarchitectural sidechannels. The Betrusted project’s scope will eventually range from secure silicon all the way to application layer code, and we are looking for developers of all stripes who are interested in contributing to the project. markdown
Comment:	production notes